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Abstract 
 
Since the late 1980s, the entry barriers for new bus and railway companies have gradually been 
reduced in Sweden. In this paper the effects of these changes upon small businesses are analysed with 
the help of a couple of case study firms. Four parts of the transportation sector are considered: local 
and regional bus services, long-distance bus services, regional train services and inter-regional train 
services. Although offering different basic conditions for entry, new as well as old small businesses 
have often faced a common problem on each of these markets: having to compete with a giant former 
monopolist or oligopolists, or being dependent on some of its/their factors of production. Although 
several firms have been forced out of the markets, a number of them have managed to survive and 
grow. In this paper it is argued that there are a few key factors that govern a small firm’s success or 
failure. 
Introduction 
 
Deregulations often aim at lowering entry and mobility barriers of an industry and thereby stimulating 
new firms to enter and new as well as old companies to grow. Swedish deregulations in the transport 
sector have seldom been carried out with this as the primary goal, and therefore the term ”regulatory 
changes” may sometimes better characterise what has been going on. Nevertheless, over the years and 
to a large extent following from these changes, competition has become an increasingly important 
feature of the Swedish transport sector. In this paper, we will take a closer look at this development in 
the Swedish bus and railway markets, focusing on the problems and possibilities facing small 
businesses. New as well as old small businesses have often faced a common problem on both of these 
markets: having to compete with a giant former monopolist or oligopolists, or being dependent on 
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some of its/their factors of production. On the other hand, it has been possible for the small businesses 
to avoid unnecessary overhead costs and they seem to be able to easily attract qualified personnel 
away from the former monopolist. In order to detect more of such factors, we have considered a 
couple of case study firms on each market, selected to represent various business strategies and 
outcomes. 
 We start by describing the changing regulatory conditions of the markets and their overall 
effects. After that, the case study firms are presented. In a concluding chapter, we summarise and 
discuss our findings, addressing the main question of this paper: What are the obstacles and the 
advantages facing small businesses willing to enter and grow in the Swedish bus and railway markets? 
The market for bus services in Sweden 
 
A market for bus traffic in Sweden has existed since the 1920’s. For many years there was no clear 
distinction between different types of bus traffic, and today’s division of the market into local and 
regional bus services, long-distance (inter-regional) services and chartered traffic has its roots in the 
public transport reforms of the late 1970’s. For scheduled traffic, bus companies were granted 
exclusive concessions on each line, preventing others to operate traffic on the same route. Otherwise, 
the firms were relatively free to act on their own initiative, developing new lines, deciding on their 
own timetables and fares - and they survived solely on ticket revenues. 
 
Local and regional bus services1 
 
In the 1960’s, when a growing part of the population started to possess cars of their own, the bus 
companies began losing passengers, leading to higher fares and the closure of many routes. Subsidies 
were introduced and several bus companies were taken over by municipalities. The growing public 
and political concern for the bus services eventually lead to a major organisational reform in the late 
1970’s. Through the law of principality, it was stipulated that a public transport authority was to be 
established in each of Sweden’s 24 counties, having the responsibility for planning local and regional 
public transportation and decicions on ticket fares. The responsibility was to be shared jointly by the 
municipalities and the county council in each county. Generally, it came to be handled through special 
county public transport undertakings formed as limited companies, hereafter referred to as the County 
Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs), with a shared ownership between the municipalities and the 
county council. Underlying this new organisational structure, the old system of concessions for 
different lines prevailed, and therefore the main task for each CPTA initially was to try co-ordinating 
these lines under a common ticket fare system. The bus companies came to be working as contractors 
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to the authorities, receiving compensation for their services and transferring all revenues from ticket 
fares to the CPTAs. Since the costs for compensating the bus companies generally were not covered 
by the revenues, the municipalities and the county councils used tax money to subsidise the traffic. 
 In quite a few counties, the CPTAs felt that the system of concessions was an obstacle to 
planning the traffic efficiently. They also felt that they had a weak bargaining position when 
negotiating the level of compensation with the bus companies, having no alternative supplier and 
lacking information on the true costs involved. As an effect, many CPTAs acquired private bus firms 
and started to perform the services by themselves, leading to a growing public sector involvement in 
local and regional bus transportation. In the mid 1980’s, between 50 percent and 60 percent of the 
costs for public bus traffic were covered through the use of tax money, compared to 20 percent in the 
beginning of the 70’s. The outcome of this development was a new law, passed in Parliament in 1985, 
that withdrew all the old concessions of the bus companies, giving the CPTAs the exclusive right to 
perform local and regional bus services. The CPTAs were hereby given an inceased freedom of 
action: a) they could perform all traffic on their own account, 2) they could continue using the 
existing firms as contractors, negotiating the terms as before, or 3) they could start procuring the 
traffic from the bus companies by means of competitive tendering. To introduce this third alternative 
was by many considered the main reason for the reform, which came to be called ”the deregulation” 
in the Swedish bus industry. 
 The implications of the deregulation came to be closely connected to how the different 
CPTAs chose to act. Almost none of them decided to increase the amount of traffic performed under 
their own management, but several chose to renegotiate the contracts with the already contracted 
firms, at least initially. A couple of CPTAs immediately subjected all their services to procurement by 
competitive tendering, while others chose to move slowly, using a step-wise approach, only 
subjecting  part of the traffic at a time. Even if the use of tendering became more and more common 
over time, there were large differences between the CPTAs in terms of time of introduction. Some 
CPTAs moved slowly due to concerns for publicly-owned bus companies. In other cases there was a 
political aversion to introduce competition which prevailed for a long time. 
 In the first tenders, the private company Linjebuss often won new traffic at the expense of 
public companies such as municipality-owned firms and the two bus companies owned by the 
Swedish State Railways (SJ), SJ Buss and GDG. The difficulties for the public companies to cope 
with competition was a phenomenon that created quite a stir. After SJ Buss had won new contracts for 
traffic by out-competing its sister company GDG, and vice versa, the first major merger in the 
industry took place. SJ Buss and GDG formed Swebus in 1990. After that the major rivals in the 
market for local and regional bus services were Swebus and Linjebuss. Linjebuss was often 
recognised as the more successful of the two, partly due to the fact that Swebus had more lines to 
defend. 
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 In the beginning of the 1990’s a process was initiated by the counties with large public 
companies, that aimed at splitting the CPTAs into two separate organisations, one concentrating on 
planning and the other on operations. In these counties, this was seen as a necessary step to make 
competitive tendering possible. The operating organisations, which often remained publicly-owned,  
had a few years to sharpen their activities before the actual start of competitive tendering. The most 
important example of such a process is the split of Storstockholms Lokaltrafik (SL) in 1990-91 into 
one organisation responsible for planning the services and a couple of fully-owned subsidiaries (SL 
Buss, SL Tunnelbanan etc.) handling operations. 
 An important obstacle for the municipality-owned bus companies was a law preventing them 
from being active outside of their own municipality.2 These companies could therefore only defend 
their own traffic and could not gain competence through participation in other competitive tenders. 
Some public bus companies chose to merge with other public companies of neighbouring 
municipalities/counties to circumvent the law. The outcome of several such events was the formation 
of a new large publicly-owned bus company in 1994, Näckrosbuss. It later became semi-private and 
in early 1999 merged with another publicly-owned company, SL Buss, to form Buslink, now 
Sweden’s second largest bus operator. 
 Many of the minor private bus companies faced hard times once competitive tendering started 
to affect their businesses. A great number of them started to seriously consider co-operation in 1992 to 
be able to compete with Swebus and Linjebuss. After a slow start, these constellations became 
increasingly successful, bringing the expansion of Linjebuss and Swebus to a halt. In 1995 one of 
them, Buss i Väst, became the largest contractor in the county of Älvsborg for example. 
 Linjebuss as well as Swebus took on international assignments early on, buying foreign 
companies and taking part in competitive tenders in Denmark, Finland and Norway. Insufficient 
profitability and growth caused  Swebus to close its activities in Norway and Denmark in 1997. 
Linjebuss still has substantial amounts of traffic in Copenhagen and has also won a tender in Norway 
for the first time. Linjebuss has also gone beyond the Nordic market, with the purchase of a Belgian 
firm in 1995 and a German enterprise in 1997. 
 For several years, foreign operators seemed to have no interest in the Swedish deregulated bus 
market, despite the increased possibilities for new entrants. It was not until the end of 1996 that a 
foreign operator stepped in. The largest privatisation in the bus industry was then realised through the 
acquisition of Swebus by the Scottish company Stagecoach. About a year later, the French operator 
CGEA acquired Linjebuss. The first foreign bus company to establish itself in Sweden through 
winning a competitive tender was Bus Denmark, a publicly-owned company. It took over a 
substantial amount of traffic in the city of Malmö in 1997, and later expanded in the same region by 
the acquisition of the private bus operator Ödåkra buss. In early 1999, Bus Denmark was acquired by 
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the British company Arriva. 
 At the end of 1998 more than 85 percent of all local and regional bus traffic had been 
procured by competitive tendering, at least once. The only large areas where competitive tendering 
have not yet occurred are the inner city of Stockholm (due for tendering in 1999), the county of 
Västmanland (where the CPTA has decided not to), and the cities of Umeå and Luleå (where 
municipality-owned public companies run the services). 
 In early 1999, the three largest bus operators in Sweden, in terms of the number of buses 
performing local and regional scheduled traffic were the following: Swebus (30% share), Buslink 
(20% share) and Linjebuss (16% share). 
 
Inter-regional, long-distance bus services3 
 
The first long-distance lines in Sweden were founded in the 1930’s, when some railway 
administrations started bus traffic as a complement to their railway lines. But it was not until 1950 
before an independent route got started. The line was initiated by a few bus companies in co-operation 
(coupling their concessions for shorter routes) and ran between the cities of Sundsvall and Umeå. 
Soon this was followed by others, but the establishment of such lines soon came to be a target for 
hampering regulations. The inter-regional bus traffic was considered a threat to the railway services 
performed by SJ, implying a very restricted granting of licences. Some already granted licences were 
even withdrawn. In the 1970’s a first move towards less restrictive entry regulations was taken, 
permitting most inter-regional bus services during weekends (Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon), 
since SJ was simply not able to meet the peaks in demand. A second move came in 1988, when the 
so-called ”means test” for new entry was abolished. A bus company no longer had to prove the need 
for a new bus line when applying for a licence. However, a new rule followed in its place, implying 
that the applicant had to prove that the suggested bus line would not be harmful to existing  
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railway services or to the local and regional bus services handled by the CPTAs. The first regulatory 
change of some significance came into effect on January 1, 1993, when the burden of proof was 
reversed. From now on, blocking new entrants was only possible if SJ and/or the affected CPTAs 
could show that an applicant’s line would really harm their existing services. After this change, a 
large number of new applications poured in. Many of these concerned daily traffic on lines where 
weekend traffic had already been permitted. SJ worked hard to stop several of these lines, ultimately 
the Government had to decide on a number of these cases in 1994. SJ’s complaints were overruled 
fully or partly in most cases, but for some routes, or parts of routes, the Government decided that 
restricted entry was still justifiable. 
 A couple of reports in 1996-97 argued that a more complete deregulation of long-distance bus 
services would have overall positive effects.4 It was shown that travelling would increase, and that the 
new passengers would consist of people that otherwise mainly would have travelled by car or chosen 
not to travel at all. SJ would therefore not suffer, at least not in the long run. Perhaps of greater 
importance was the sale of Swebus to a foreign operator (Stagecoach). This meant that SJ no longer 
controlled the dominant operator of long-distance bus services. Under its new owner, Swebus started 
to expand its network of long-distance services, exploiting the possibilities of the regulatory 
framework to the limit, and also challenging these limits by filing applications for new lines that had 
previously not been granted. In the beginning of 1998, the authority responsible for handling these 
applications, The National Road Administration, had come to the conclusion that SJ was not able to 
prove these bus lines harmful, with the exception of a very limited number of routes. Swebus was 
therefore to be allowed to start daily bus services between, for example, Göteborg and Malmö. Once 
one operator had got the permission to start running services on a certain route, granting others the 
same permission was only a matter of formality. 
 In the spring of 1998, a new Transport Policy Bill was on the agenda. To everyone’s surprise, 
the Government suggested an almost complete deregulation of the inter-regional bus market, to come 
into effect at the turn of the year 1998/99. SJ’s view would no longer be taken into consideration 
when deciding on permissions for new long-distance routes. The only remaining concerns to be taken 
into account would be the ones of the CPTAs. The reasoning behind the deregulation was to improve 
the possibilities for the general public to travel, and to increse the pressure on SJ to become more 
efficient and market-oriented. 
 So far, the effects of the latest step in the deregulation process are not obvious. It seems as if 
the main events happened already in the summer of 1998, following the permissions for new lines and 
daily departures that preceded the actual deregulation. Several new entrants have appeared, most of 
them specialising in traffic on single lines, while the old players have expanded their already 
established services. Overall, the market has exploded since Swebus started to expand in early 1997, 
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nearly doubling the total supply of bus kilometers between 1996 and 1998. Swebus dominates the 
market, carrying roughly 50 percent of all passengers. 
The passenger railway market5 
 
Ever since the 1950’s, SJ has been facing the problem of unprofitable railway lines. The closure of 
these lines has sometimes been the only possible solution, but frequently the discontinuation of train 
services has been a politically very difficult decision to take. This lead to the introduction of subsidies 
aimed at upholding non-profitable services. In 1963, this practise became officially established by 
means of the division of the Swedish railway network into one commercial part and one subsidised 
part. 
 Despite efforts of state intervention in 1979 and 1985, SJ’s financial position deteriorated 
during the 1980’s and reached a crisis in 1986, when SJ estimated that it needed 1 billion SEK in 
additional state aid. A government plan called for drastic changes and the outcome was the 1988 
Transport Policy Act, which may be viewed as an attempt to, once and for all, solve the problems with 
the unprofitable regional lines and the need for infrastructure investments, and turn SJ into a 
profitable train operator. 
 The main feature of the 1988 Transport Policy Act was the decision to vertically separate the 
state’s track infrastructure assets from railway operations. The responsibility for the former was to be 
handled by the administrative body called Banverket (the Swedish National Rail Administration) 
while the reformed SJ was to concentrate on performing railway services and becoming a profitable 
train operator. 
 Among many other things, the Act also implied a new classification of the state’s railway 
network into main lines and county lines. SJ would continue to have the exclusive right to perform the 
services along the main lines, while the responsibility for the local and regional passenger services on 
the county lines was transferred from SJ to the CPTAs. One goal behind this reform was to increase 
the co-ordination of regional bus services and regional railway traffic. 
 
Local and regional railway services 
 
The transfer of responsibility for local and regional lines to the CPTAs came into effect in most 
counties in mid 1990. As a compensation for their thereby increased costs, the CPTAs were to receive 
an annual state-subsidy, for a period of 10 years, amounting to SJ’s operating deficits on each line. In 
addition to these direct subsidies, the rolling stock used by SJ on the affected lines were donated by 
the state to the CPTAs, under the condition that the regional railway services were to be continued. 
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 With the rail infrastructure in the hands of a national authority (Banverket), SJ turned into a 
train operator, and the vehicles, money and responsibility for the regional passenger services in the 
hands of the CPTAs, the door was open for competitive tendering for the contracts of actually 
performing these services. The first tenders were carried out in 1989. 
 In December 1995 a bill was passed that implied the deregulation of rail freight services, 
giving new freight operators more or less open access to the whole railway network. The bill came 
into effect on July 1, 1996. At the same time, the CPTAs received the right to run services on the main 
lines too within their respective counties. After special government decisions, this could be extended 
to services reaching into other counties. In practice, this meant that a larger amount of traffic could be 
subjected to competitive tendering.  
 In some counties, the regional train services have been subjected to tendering several times 
since 1989. Some CPTAs have chosen only to re-negotiate with SJ instead of going for an actual 
tender, but an important change even with this arrangement is the fact that SJ has become a contractor 
rather than a provider of services under its own flag. Some long-term agreements between CPTAs and 
SJ implies that certain services will not be subjected to a first tender for another couple of years. 
 A limited number of new train operators have been able to enter the market for regional train 
services by means of winning tenders performed by the CPTAs, beginning in 1990 with BK Tåg, 
followed by Sydtåg in 1995, and Linjebuss and BSM Järnväg in 1998. VIA/Go Ahead (in 
collaboration with BK Tåg) will enter in January 2000. 
 The competition taking place at the tenders for regional services may be described as 
competition for the tracks, resulting in gross contracts. The CPTAs decide upon the supply, timetable 
and ticket fares. Contracted operators are provided with the needed rolling stock by the CPTAs and 
are paid for their costs of performing the traffic. Revenues from ticket fares generally accrue to the 
CPTAs. Consequently, the terms are very similar to the ones in use for regional bus services, with the 
exception of the ownership of the rolling stock. 
 A thorough compilation of the cost effects of tendering for regional railway services has not 
yet been done, but available examples indicate cost savings in the magnitude of 20-25 percent. In 
some cases, the entry of new operators has implied innovative cost saving practices.  BK Tåg took the 
initiative to make maintenance of the rail cars cheaper, for example by changing from railway specific 
to more standardised bus engines. 
 In most counties, the CPTAs and their owners have had the ambition to keep and develop the 
regional services, even if this has sometimes implied increased subsidisation. In some cases, a 
remarkable growth in patronage has been achieved. 
 
Inter-regional railway services 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ehrling (1998). 
 9 
 
When SJ got rid of the responsibility for the track infrastructure, by means of the Transport Policy Act 
of 1988, it was directed only to perform services that were possible to run with a profit. Under the 
new order, large parts of the non-profitable services were run on the county lines and were therefore 
under the responsibility of the CPTAs. However, there were also some services on the main line 
network that were non-profitable, but nevertheless were considered to be valuable to keep for socio-
economic and political reasons. Beginning in 1988, the state was to be responsible for these services 
by means of procuring them, instead of just transferring subsidies to SJ every year to cover the 
deficits. During 1988-91 these procurements took place without the element of competition, i.e. the 
state’s negotiator had the task of trying to get SJ to perform as much traffic as possible for a sum that 
was decided upon each year. However, in 1992, it became possible for the first time to procure the 
services by means of competitive tendering. 
 SJ has always defined what inter-regional lines to be procured, by pointing out the 
unprofitable services. For outsiders, it has not been possible to get a look into SJ’s financial situation 
on each line. Based upon SJ’s suggestions, the Government and the Parliament then finally decide 
what traffic to be procured. The resulting contracts of the tendering process are net contracts, giving 
much freedom to the operator as long as a minimum supply of train services are carried out. In 
contrast to the gross contracts of the regional services, the operator receives all the revenues from 
ticket fares. There is also another important difference which concerns the rolling stock: vehicles are 
not provided by the procuring authority. A new entrant therefore has to be able to come up with 
rolling stock of its own or close a deal with SJ on renting vehicles. 
 A new entrant is to get access to terminals and stations on equal terms with SJ. Of importance 
for the tenders in recent years is the transfer of the train traffic control unit from SJ to Banverket, 
making it easier to set equal costs for the train traffic control function. The first year of competitive 
tendering for these services implied a significant cost reduction for the state (-21 percent in real 
prices) with competing bids on all affected lines. In the following years, the costs have been kept 
stable by means of tendering, while the interest from competitors to SJ has diminished. Up to 1998, 
when the line Göteborg-Malmö was included in the tendering process for the very first time, SJ had 
succeeded in winning all contracts. However, the tender of this particular line became the breaking 
point for other train operators to enter this part of the railway market. BK Tåg in alliance with VIA 
and Go Ahead will take over the services on that line in January 2000.  
A summary of the changed conditions on each market 
 
Table 1 summarises the changed conditions over the past ten years for both the railway market and the 
bus market, and presents an overview of the type of competition mainly affecting the different sub-
markets. The market for bus services may be divided into three sub-markets: 1) scheduled local and 
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regional services, 2) scheduled inter-regional services, and 3) tourist/chartered traffic. Here we 
consider mainly the first two of these. For the scheduled local and regional bus services we have seen 
a transition from a system of local subsidised monopolies where each company had the exclusive 
licence to its lines, to a system of public procurement by competitive tendering. For the scheduled 
inter-regional services, competition on a commercial basis (without subsidies) has dominated for the 
whole period. Here, the process of change is very close to a step-wise deregulation in a traditional 
sense, resulting in lower barriers to entry. 
 The passenger railway market may be divided into three sub-markets: 1) regional services, 2) 
non-profitable inter-regional services, and 3) profitable inter-regional services. Again, the first two are 
of most interest here, since profitable services have not been subjected to competition (with the 
exception of the new Arlanda airport link, which is supposed to be profitable). On both of these sub-
markets, SJ used to have a monopoly position, receiving subsidies from the state. Today, these 
services are subjected to public procurement by competitive tendering. Although competitive 
tendering has emerged as the principle form of competition on most of the described sub-markets, 
there are important differences between them in terms of the types of contracts in use. Local and 
regional railway traffic has mainly been exposed to competitive gross contract tendering, which has 
also been the case for local and regional bus services. Long distance railway traffic, on the other hand, 
has mainly been exposed to competitive net contract tendering. 
 A fundamental difference between the markets for railway and bus transportation is the 
former market structure. The bus market was characterised by the existence of a large number of 
privately and publicly owned enterprises, yet with very limited competition between them. The 
railway market, on the other hand, was totally dominated by one single operator, SJ, enjoying a legal 
monopoly. 
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Table 1. Forms of competition on different parts of the Swedish bus and railway markets 
Part of passenger transportation 1988 1999 Year of 
Market Type of competition Type of competition change 
Bus market Scheduled local and regional 
services (non-profitable) 
Local subsidised 
monopolies (procurement 
without tendering) 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering; 
gross contracts 
1989 
 Scheduled inter-regional 
services (profitable) 
Limited competition 
New entry blocked by SJ 
Competition, some 
remaining restrictions to 
entry  
1993 
1999 
 Tourist/Chartered traffic Competition (open entry) Competition (open entry) -- 
Railway 
market 
Regional services (non-
profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks); gross contracts 
1990 
 Inter-regional services (non-
profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks); net contracts 
1992 
 Inter-regional services 
(profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly SJ holds monopoly -- 
 
The dominant firms and the case study firms  
 
In this section, we will take a closer look at the firms dominating the Swedish bus and railway 
markets of today, along with a couple of case study firms, representing small businesses applying 
different strategies to enter and grow. Table 2 gives an overview of the considered firms, indicating 
on what parts of the passenger transportation markets they are active. 
 
Table 2. Bus companies and train operators 
Company / Bus services Train services 
Organisation Local & regional Inter-regional Local & regional Inter-regional 
Swebus X X   
Svenska Buss  X   
Säffle Reseservice X X   
Y-bussen  X   
Buss i Väst X    
SJ   X X 
BK Tåg (X) 1 (X) 1 X (X) 2 
BSM Järnväg   X (X) 3 
Sydtåg   (X) 4  
1
 Present through sister company BK Buss. 
2
 Will enter in January 2000 through alliance with VIA and Go Ahead in January. 
3
 Will probably enter in January 2000. 
4
 Bankrupt in 1997. 
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Bus companies 
Swebus 
 
Swebus is the dominating company for long-distance bus services in Sweden, having roughly a 50% 
market share in terms of passengers. This branch of its business originates in the weekend traffic 
performed by SJ Buss, complementing SJ’s passenger train services. When Swebus was founded in 
1990, through the merger of SJ Buss and GDG Biltrafik, their combined supply of long-distance lines 
formed a separate division called Swebus Express. Later, a couple of other long-distance lines were 
added to this division, following Swebus’ purchases of Postens Diligenstrafik and Wasatrafik. 
 As long as Swebus was a part of the SJ Group, the owner was clearly reluctant to expansion, 
hindering exploitation of even the limited possibilities to expand under the regulatory regime at the 
time. When Swebus was sold to Stagecoach in October 1996, conditions were changed almost 
immediately. In spring 1997, the new owner initiated a heavy expansion of the services of the already 
established lines and filed several requests for the opening of new lines. The supply of Swebus 
Express has more than doubled since late 1996. In recent years, the network has become concentrated 
to the southern and middle parts of Sweden. 
 Swebus has a remaining favourable position in terms of access to certain terminals and 
facilities in several cities, dating back to the time when Swebus was a subsidiary to SJ. In some cases 
this has caused troubles for new entrants. In Stockholm, Swebus foundeda special travel agency, 
BusStop, for the marketing and sales of tickets to its long-distance bus services. On a commission 
basis, other operators’ tickets were also sold. Since 1996 this busiiness is run jointly by the leading 
firms of the industry. In order to get its services visible to the general public, a new operator has to 
enter this partnership (which may be a lengthy process) or at least close a deal with BusStop to sell its 
tickets on commission. 
 Swebus’ position on the market for local and regional bus services is less dominant compared 
to long-distance services (30% market share and no obvious favourable position concerning critical 
resources) but benefits from scale economies. 
Buss i Väst 
 
Buss i Väst was formed in 1993 as a collaboration between 50 minor bus firms, in order to place joint 
bids in upcoming tenders for local and regional bus services. At the time, the threat from Swebus and 
Linjebuss was evident for many of these firms. In 1995, Buss i Väst became the largest contractor in 
the county of Älvsborg, with 110 buses in scheduled traffic (37%), and in 1996 the constellation won 
traffic for 140 buses (75%) in the county of Skaraborg. In 1999, Buss i Väst has contracts with five 
CPTAs for performing traffic with 410 buses. Together with additional separate contracts of the 
participating companies (215 buses), the companies of Buss i Väst has reached a combined market 
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share of nearly 9%. 
Svenska Buss 
 
Svenska Buss is a constellation of about 10 private bus companies, co-operating around the supply of 
12 long-distance bus lines in southern and mid-Sweden. The services were more or less unchanged 
between the 1970s and up to 1994, when more licenses were granted and an expansion from strictly 
weekend services to daily services on some lines was initiated.  Although the timetables bear the 
unifying name of the co-operative organisation, each bus company handles its own marketing at the 
local level. Outside the co-operation within Svenska Buss, the included companies run charter traffic 
of their own and sometimes scheduled services under contract to county public transport authorities. 
The Swedish Competition Authority has investigated the constellation, especially since Linjebuss 
acquired one of the involved firms, but so far Svenska Buss has been able to continue operations in its 
current form.   
 
Säffle Reseservice 
 
Säffle Reseservice is a private bus company running mostly long-distance lines under the brand name 
of Säfflebussen. The company was founded in 1960 when it started a few bus lines that ran during 
holidays. In 1990 it became a member of the Svenska Buss co-operation. But it was not until the 
beginning of 1994 that Säffle Reseservice started to expand. In 1997 the company withdrew from the 
collaboration since management felt that the co-operation within Svenska Buss was unsatisfactory. 
Today the companyís long-distance network comprises of 8 different routes. Recently, Säffle 
Reseservice has also entered the market for local and regional bus services. 
Y-bussen 
 
A number of private bus companies started to operate lines between Stockholm and the northern part 
of Sweden during the 1960’s. In 1970 the companies were asked to form an alliance to be allowed to 
continue the traffic, leading to the formation of Norrbuss, consisting of a large number of co-operating 
bus companies. Later, it was demanded that state-owned SJ Buss should be invited to participate in 
the co-operation. Otherwise, operations had to stop. From 1976 the traffic was carried out under the 
name of Y-bussen, due to the Y-shape of the line’s extensions (after Härnösand the line is divided into 
two parts - one going to Örnsköldsvik and the other to Sollefteå). In the early 1990’s , the Swedish 
Competition Authority took a closer look at the co-operation, producing contradictory advise 
compared to previous state directives. The Competition Authority considered it inappropriate that the 
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publicly-owned bus operator, Swebus (former SJ buss), participated in a co-operation between private 
bus firms. After that, Swebus remained involved only as a subcontractor. 
 In 1995 Y-bussen started to operate traffic to Östersund and in 1996 the line to Örnsköldsvik 
was extended to Umeå. At the same time, daily departures were introduced. In 1995 another bus 
operator, Nordins Trafik, started operating services between Stockholm and Umeå under the name of 
Stockholmsexpressen, becoming a very annoying competitor to Y-bussen. At the end of 1996, after 
one and a half years of head-on competition, Nordins was purchased by Y-bussen and their services 
between Stockholm and Umeå became co-ordinated. At the same time Y-bussen was converted into a 
regular corporation with four equally involved owners: Svenssons Bussar i Gnarp, Werner Westins 
Buss, Byberg & Nordins and Linjebuss. 
 
Train operators 
SJ 
 
The former monopolist SJ is still the dominant operator of the Swedish railway sector, regardless of 
what part of the market is considered. In late 1998, SJ run 100% of all interregional lines (profitable 
as well as non-profitable) and had a 55% share of the revenues concerning CPTA-managed services 
that had been subjected to tendering. Following the outcome of recent tenders for CPTA-managed 
regional services as well as inter-regional services, this will change in January 2000. Nevertheless, SJ 
still enjoys a legal monopoly on the profitable parts of the inter-regional network and also controls 
critical assets such as the railway stations and most of the rolling stock. This is especially important to 
consider for potential entrants to the procured inter-regional services. For the operators that have a 
history as freight operators, several have run into conflict with SJ, due to SJ’s control of 30% of the 
fringe railway tracks and its powers over sub-contractors on this part of the market. 
BK Tåg 
 
BK Tåg, the sister company to a privately owned bus company called BK Buss, is the most well-
known of the new train operators emerging in the wake of the introduction of competitive tendering 
for regional train services. The company was active as a bidder in most of the introductory round of 
tenders that took place in 1989. It resulted in four-year contracts with the CPTAs in the counties of 
Halland, Jönköping and Kalmar for a total of five routes, totalling about 450 km of tracks. These 
were, in fact, the only lines after the first round of tenders that were contracted to another operator 
than SJ. BK Tåg started to operate these lines in late May 1990. The second round of tendering for 
these lines resulted in a complete victory for SJ in 1993. This tender has ever since been the subject of 
a dispute between, on the one hand, BK Tåg and the Swedish Competition Authority, and on the other 
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hand, SJ.6 BK Tåg re-entered as an operator in the county in 1996, by means of winning a tender for 
some new county train services on the main line, but today the company has no longer any contract 
for passenger services in this region. 
 In June 1992 BK Tåg started to run services on the county line between Borlänge and Malung 
in the county of Dalarna. SJ won the contract for these services after negotiations with the CPTA in 
1989, but in the first real tender BK Tåg put in the best bid. In 1994 SJ won back the contract but 
again lost to BK Tåg three years later. This is the only case where BK Tåg and SJ have been taking 
turns in this way. 
 In spring 1997, another train operator, Sydtåg, went bankrupt (see below). In the auctioning of 
its assets, BK Tåg got hold of the contract for the passenger services between Ystad and Simrishamn. 
For the remaining two years of the contract-period, BK Tåg run these services under contract to the 
CPTA of Kristianstad in Skåne county. When these services were re-tendered in 1998, BK Tåg was 
able to win the contract for the following period as well.  
 In the spring of 1998, BK Tåg closed a deal with French company VIA GTI and the British 
Go Ahead Group, in order to bid jointly in upcoming tenders for train services. This marks a 
reawakening of the co-operation between BK Tåg and VIA GTI that resulted in a joint bid for one of 
the Stockholm metro lines in 1993. In mid December 1998, the result of the tender for the commuter 
services in Stockholm was made public. As of January 2000, BK Tåg together with its foreign 
partners will take over these services for a period of at least five years, implying the loss for SJ of its 
single most important contract. The same constellation of companies will also be the first new entrant 
of the market for inter-regional passenger services, as a result of the state’s tender for the line between 
Göteborg and Malmö. Apart from running passenger train services, BK Tåg is also very active in the 
rail freight sector. 
Sydtåg 
 
This private company experienced a brief period as an operator of passenger train services under 
contract to the CPTA of Kristianstad in Skåne county. In 1995 it won the tender for the traffic 
between Simrishamn and Ystad in the very south of Sweden. It was a four-year contract beginning in 
June 1995. Founded in 1991, Sydtåg had previously been busy in the railway sector as a freight 
operator, working as a sub-contractor to SJ. In early 1997, the company ran into financial difficulties. 
It seems as if its number of personnel had been growing too fast in response to expected future 
increases in freight volumes (projected by SJ). When the freight volumes decreased instead, the 
company went bankrupt. 
                                                 
6SJ was accused of having deliberately placed a bid in the tender that went below SJ’s actual costs of 
performing the services. In December 1998, a court found SJ guilty and sentenced SJ to pay a fine of 8 million 
SEK for this malpractice. BK Tåg has now sued SJ for damages. 
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BSM Järnväg AB 
 
BSM Järnväg is a subsidiary to the private company Bergkvist Svets & Mekaniska (BSM), which 
started out as an engineering workshop near Borlänge (in Dalarna county) back in 1972. In 1993 BSM 
became involved in the renewing and building of railways, working as a contractor to Banverket, 
before turning mainly into a train freight operator in 1996. The BSM train division was transformed 
into the subsidiary BSM Järnväg on January 1, 1998. 
 In August 1998 BSM Järnväg became the most recent new entrant on the passenger rail 
market in Sweden, after having won the third round of tendering for the services which BK Tåg once 
won in 1990, i.e. in the counties of Jönköping, Halland and Kalmar. Of crucial importance for the 
company’s success in this tender, seems to be a deal it closed with SJ for access to SJ’s repair shop in 
Nässjö. In this year’s tender for the inter-regional services procured by the state, it seems as if BSM 
Järnväg will once again come out as a winner. The final decision has to be taken by the Government, 
but it is very likely that BSM Järnväg will start running the inter-regional services between Skövde 
and Nässjö in January 2000. 
Concluding discussion 
 
As seen above, the Swedish passenger transport sector has been increasingly opened up to 
competition in various forms. We have in this paper showed a few examples of new firms that have 
established themselves in the sector and some old ones that have experienced a period of growth. 
Based upon the the general description of the effects of deregulation, along with the description of the 
case study firms, we have tried to identify a the obstacles and advantages facing small business firms, 
in order to explain their situation and development. These are summarised in Tables 3 and 4 and 
discussed further below. 
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Table 3. Obstacles and possibilities on the market for bus transportation 
Obstacles Advantages & possibilities 
Local and regional Long distance Local and regional Long distance 
Difficulties in attracting 
qualified personnel 
Difficulties in attracting 
qualified personnel 
Alliances and co-operation Alliances and co-operation 
Lack of uniformity 
between the CPTAs’ 
demands on buses 
The Competition Law, 
restricting co-operation 
between firms 
Sideline businesses Sideline businesses 
 Access to terminals  Low formal entry barriers 
 Lack of marketing 
channels and information 
on competing traffic 
 Early establishment 
 County mergers   
 The CPTAs remaining 
rights to block new lines 
  
 Linked traffic licences of 
CPTAs 
  
 
 
Obstacles on the bus market 
 
As follows from the table, the obstacles on the market for long-distance bus services are numerous, 
clearly outnumbering the ones for local and regional services. On both markets, the firms experience 
difficulties in attracting qualified personnel. Some firms, for example Säffle Reseservice, is not able 
to expand their traffic as much as they want to because of this, despite the high rate of unemployment 
in Sweden. To some extent, this paradoxically seems to be related to difficulties in getting trade 
unions to accept higher wages only for certain categories of bus drivers, rather than raising wages for 
everyone.  For the local and regional services, the dissimilar requirements on buses specified by 
the county public transport authorities put constraints on standardisation. A certain bus type required 
in one county may not be used in another county without conversion. The incurred extra costs could 
be particularly hard for a small company to bear.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, it seems as if one important obstacle for these firms has been actions 
takens by the Swedish Competition Authority, putting constraints on smaller firms’ abilities to co-
operate. This has affected for example Svenska Buss and Y-buss. The Competition Authority did not 
like the way the Svenska Buss co-operation was organised, with the involvement of a major firm like 
Linjebuss. This was also the case for Y-buss, but this time Swebus’ involvement was in focus. 
 Swebus long history of being the major provider of long-distance bus services has given them 
an infrastructure advantage. The company controls several important terminals used also by other bus 
operators. 
 A common problem for long-distance bus services is the difficulties in getting hold of 
information on what lines are running and by whom. This is considered to be a problem for new 
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operators as well as the general public. A company interested in starting a line may have difficulties 
both in finding out who the competitors are, and after the traffic has started, reaching the public with 
information on its line. To close a deal with the ticket-sales agency BusStop is crucial, since this is the 
only existing place where up-to date information on long-distance bus traffic is collectively on 
display. 
 In recent years, the mergers of several counties into larger areas has made the old definition of 
long-distance services obsolete. Some long-distance lines are now only considered regional and may 
therefore be overtaken by the CPTAs. Hitherto, this has not implied any actual conflict of interests. 
However, there have been some conflicts in the past, when some CPTAs co-operated to circumvent 
the county limit. By the use of linked traffic licences, they sometimes established their own long-
distance lines, competing with the commercial traffic.  
 Even after the latest deregulatory step the CPTAs may still block new long-distance lines if 
these are considered to have negative effects on passenger rates of local and regional lines. So far, the 
CPTAs have not been very active in enforcing this power. They also have the burden of proof. 
 
Advantages and possibilities on the bus market 
 
The advantages and possibilities listed in Table 3 are not only true for smaller companies but have 
been found to influence the performance of all companies in the market. However, with their weaker 
positions the effects on the smaller firms are much more pronounced. 
 Both for the local and regional bus market and for long distance bus services, a sideline 
business may give the company a better financial endurance and spreading of revenue risk. It is a 
common phenomenon in the industry that companies perform a variety of different types of services. 
For example, a company may perform local scheduled services during weekdays, while concentrating 
on tourist and/or long-distance services during the weekends. 
 Through co-operation on the market for local and regional services, it is possible for small 
firms to become trustworthy bidders for larger amounts of traffic, to increase the usage of buses (and 
thereby make a reduction of the combined fleet of vehicles possible), and to exploit other scale 
economies, probably most prominent in the procurement of vehicles, fuel and tyres. This can be done 
while keeping small-scale advantages such as low overhead cost and a good knowledge about the 
local market. On the market for long-distance bus services, a couple of small companies may be able 
to create a larger traffic network, which can then attract more customers and benefit from scale 
economies, for example in marketing. 
 For the long distance bus market, early establishment has often been considered important. 
This has especially been the case in the past when each line was licensed to a particular enterprise. 
Having been present in the market for a long period of time implies that a bus company usually has 
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acquired a good knowledge of the market and a brand name with the public. This could make it easier 
to grow organically. An important advantage for bus companies interested in entering the market for 
long distance services are that the formal barriers to entry are fairly low now. The continued 
deregulation in the industry has made it possible for almost anyone to enter. All one needs is a bus, 
which is something that is relatively cheap and easy to come by, for example through leasing. 
 
 
Table 4. Obstacles and possibilities on the market for railway transportation 
Obstacles Advantages & possibilities 
Local and regional Long distance Local and regional Long distance 
The behaviour of some of 
the local personnel of SJ 
Requirements to be able 
to come up with rolling 
stock 
Easiness to attract 
qualified personnel 
Easiness to attract 
qualified personnel 
Remaining long-term 
contracts 
Short contracts Alliances with other, more 
established, companies 
Alliances with other, more 
established, companies 
Access to workshop to 
maintain rolling stock 
Access to workshop to 
maintain rolling stock 
Sideline businesses Sideline businesses 
 SJ’s control of some 
critical resources 
A good knowledge of the 
regulations governing 
railway services 
A good knowledge of the 
regulations governing 
railway services 
 SJ’s possibility to control 
which lines that are 
tendered 
  
 
 
Obstacles on the railway market 
 
Generally, there are more obstacles to be overcome for a new firm wishing to enter or grow in the 
market for long-distance railway transportation compared to the market for regional railway services. 
Also, they are of a more serious nature. Among these are the higher requirements from the procuring 
authority (the state) upon the operator to be able to provide the needed rolling stock.7 In combination 
with this, the short contract periods put smaller companies in a difficult situation. The purchase of a 
train set can be characterised by its long delivery time and the size of the investment. A short contract 
makes the incentive for own investments very low. Therefore, the only possible option is to close a 
deal with the main competitor, SJ, to get hold of rolling stock.  
 Contracts often involve demands on a certain degree of maintenance of the rolling stock. The 
contractor will therefore have to get hold of (or have access to) facilities like a repair shop. In some 
cases a new repair shop has been constructed from scratch (as BK Tåg did in Vetlanda and BSM 
                                                 
7
 For most regional services, the CPTA will  provide the operator with the rolling stock. However, in the county 
of Värmland this has recently been changed. There, the CPTA has exchanged its rolling stock with SJ for a 
remodelling of the train sets. This means that a company wishing to compete in that area in the future has to 
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Järnväg did in Mockfjärd). Otherwise, this service has been bought from another train operator. For 
example, for their rail cars running in the county of Dalarna, BK Tåg buys this service from BSM 
Järnväg, while BSM Järnväg has contracted out the maintenance for their trains running in the county 
of Småland to SJ’s repair shop in Nässjö. This implies that the relationship between the railway 
companies varies, in certain instances they compete while in others they experience a buyer-seller 
relationship. 
 The former monopolist still controls certain critical resources related to the infrastructure, 
such as railway stations and platforms. This has caused problems mainly for several of the minor 
freight operators in the past, but has also had important implications for the possibility to enter the 
inter-regional lines, making it necessary for a new operator to reach an agreement directly with SJ to 
get access to these resources. 
 The behaviour of some of the local personnel at SJ has been a source of trouble, primarily in 
the past. One example refers to when BK Tåg had won its first contract in the county of Småland. 
During the first few days of the contract period the company faced large problems in locating the rail 
cars to be used and dealing with the staff of the traffic control unit in Nässjö, who withheld 
information on sudden changes of platforms etc. Also at higher levels of management, SJ seems to 
have pursued a policy of trying to force BK Tåg out of business. At least, this is the conclusion to be 
drawn from the recently completed trial concerning SJ’s bidding practice. 
 The lack of tendering and the existence of some long-term contracts with SJ in some parts of 
the country is an obstacle for entry to the market for regional services. Similarly, when it comes to 
long-distance railway transportation one of the most important obstacles might be the fact that it is in 
the hands of SJ to decide what lines that should be subjected to competitive tendering. Only those 
lines that are considered unprofitable by SJ will face the test of the market forces. This has raised 
questions about the transparency in SJ’s costs and revenues, or rather the lack of it. A recent event 
related to this was when SJ, in October 1998, asked for the lines between Stockholm and Östersund, 
and Stockholm-Falun/Mora/Borlänge to be tendered, only to (two months later) withdraw them when 
the tendering process was about to start. Incidentally, this occurred right after it had been revealed that 
BK Tåg/VIA/Go Ahead was about to win the contract for the West Coast Line. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
come up with its own trains. 
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Advantages and possibilities on the railway market 
 
The advantages for small businesses and the available possibilities are generally the same concerning 
both the market for regional and the market for inter-regional railway services. An especially 
important advantage for all new entrants seems to be the relative easiness to attract qualified 
personnel. One reason is the fact that SJ has dramatically reduced its workforce in recent years. The 
new entrants have therefore been able to avoid spending large sums of money on education. Also of 
importance is the fact that the new entrants have had the possibility to employ only the people who 
are willing to accept changed working conditions, giving them a very motivated workforce. 
 Having a sideline business seems to have been an important way to level the ups and downs in 
the firm economy as well as serving as stepping-stones to continued growth. BK Tåg managed to 
survive despite a couple of hard years for its passenger business by use of its built-up competence in 
rail car maintenance and by competing at the relatively more open rail freight market. BSM Järnväg 
used its competence in railway construction to move into the rail freight market and then into the 
passenger rail services. For Sydtåg, however, although freight operations paved the way for entry to 
the regional passenger train market, it later became the company’s doom when SJ’s projected 
increases in freight volumes did not live up to expectations. One lesson to be drawn from this is to 
consider the risk related with being very dependent on SJ. 
 Recently, the formation of international alliances with foreign firms has allowed the Swedish 
new entrants to try bidding for contracts of a larger size, such as the commuter traffic in Stockholm 
and the West Coast Line. Apart from establishing a sufficient capital base, the sharing of experiences 
and the gains in credibility towards the procuring authority are important parts of this process. When 
successful, as in the case of BK Tåg, it turns the small business railway operator into a major player. 
 Many companies have complained of the intricate regulations concerning railway traffic. A 
good knowledge of the rules that govern the business will therefore ease the difficulties. Some of the 
new railway operators have been able to benefit from hiring people that used to have key positions at 
the authorities responsible for the development of and appliance of the detailed regulatory framework. 
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